Previous
The notion of a “changing” or “shifting” world has perhaps become increasingly ubiquitous as a buzzword across academic discourses. Within the think tank community, this term often alludes to the trend of political polarisation, deconsolidation of democracy, and a growing disdain for science-based policymaking. Underpinning these observations is the broader assumption of the waning influence of the U.S.-led liberal international order (LIO), following Trump’s re-election and the rise of far-right politics across Western liberal democracies.
Download the On Think Tanks State of the Sector Report 2025
One of the most apparent manifestations of this is discussed by Paula Martínez, who draws attention to the abrupt withdrawal of USAID funding, which has precipitated a “funding crisis” of think tanks in Mexico. Unfortunately, this is not just an isolated case happening in the U.S., but reflective of broader patterns among traditional donor countries, such as the Netherlands, Sweden, Germany, and many other places where far-right narratives are increasingly shaping international funding agendas. In response to this evolving geopolitical landscape, this article argues that think tanks must rethink their role in the ‘business-as-usual’ approach to entrenched funding structures that have long perpetuated global inequalities.
Discrepancies between think tanks in Europe and Asia
The annual State of the Sector survey conducted by OTT underscores significant divergences between the perception of the retreat of USAID in Europe and Asia. According to this year’s survey, USAID has a considerably greater impact on think tanks in Asia (50.5%) compared to those in Europe (33.7%), primarily within non-EU Europe & the Caucasus.
Approximately more than half of the think tanks in Asia surveyed come from countries categorised as lower-middle-income, making them more dependent on international donors. Many of the think tanks in Asia surveyed claimed that they received most of their funding from international organisations and government grants, whereas think tanks in Europe received more funding from grants and charitable donations. As a result, think tanks in Asia and some parts of Europe are more vulnerable to budget cuts from international donors.
Project-based international funds significantly drive the agenda in certain parts of Asia and non-EU Europe. At the same time, diversified sources enable other actors, such as the media and the private sector, to play a more significant role in Europe. In addition, think tanks in higher-income countries in Europe tend to have larger budgets and a larger proportion of core funding, allowing them to have some degree of independence in their work. Meanwhile, think tanks with smaller budgets tend to spend more time maintaining their reputation and securing funding to cover often short-term expenses than those with larger resources and core funding. This limits the think tanks’ ability to produce outputs and truly influence policymaking.
Foreign funding, despite becoming a supporting pillar of civil society, is built on not only a fragile structure but also on donor-recipient relations between the Global South and North, which replicate the asymmetrical power relations that are often-ignored elements in shaping discourse and knowledge. This not only creates financial or logistical problems but also an epistemic one: it shapes what gets researched, whose voices are amplified, and which issues are considered urgent. Consequently, knowledge production continues to be reproduced based on the European or Eurocentric model, while continuously ignoring the voices of the Global South and civil society.
Beyond funding: Underscoring the need for Europe-Asian think tank dialogue
The survey further reveals distinct regional variations in thematic priorities. In Europe, environmental issues are among the top concerns that think tanks in the region address; meanwhile, in Asia, governance issues are at the top of the priority list. Economic concerns remain a shared interest, presenting a valuable entry point for deeper collaboration and mutual benefit.
Environmental issues, by their very nature, transcend borders and necessitate collective global responses. European think tanks should collaborate with counterparts in other parts of the world, particularly regions disproportionately affected by climate change, such as South Asia and Southeast Asia. Europe needs to avoid the top-down imposition of European priorities and instead engage with Asian think tanks to identify priorities jointly.
International donors primarily shape governance issues; however, it is essential to note that donor agencies often promote a model of good governance based on a standardised ‘one-size-fits-all’ template. In this case, think tanks need to move beyond executing projects and also work together with civil society organisations, incorporating local context and knowledge into their work, making it less elitist and technocratic. This requires acknowledging the epistemic inequalities embedded within the donor–recipient framework and promoting more inclusive forms of knowledge production.
While concerns over political constraints have historically been more pronounced in Asia—due to increasing restrictions in East and Southeast Asia, as well as state control in Central Asia—recent trends indicate that European think tanks are also facing an increasingly hostile environment. Rising far-right sentiment, anti-globalist rhetoric, and the erosion of support for evidence-based policy have become common challenges across both regions. These phenomena are not isolated but deeply interlinked, reflecting the broader fragility of democratic institutions and civic space.
Beyond diversifying funding: Underscoring Asia-Europe think tank dialogue
Thus, a more nuanced response to the current funding crisis is needed. It is not an isolated trend but reflects a broader pattern of not just polarisation, but also nationalist de-globalising tendencies. Instead of merely being viewed as a challenge, it can indeed be a watershed moment in rethinking how not only vulnerable, but also unequal and transactional funding mechanisms have been in the past. While diversifying funding sources, through private sector partnerships, philanthropic donations, or membership-based contributions, is necessary, it is by no means sufficient. At a time when critical, value-based, and evidence-based policy works are being attacked, the role of the think tank is more relevant than ever before.
At STEAR, we believe that intercultural and intercivilisational dialogues are imperative. Two-way exchanges between European and Asian think tanks, or beyond, are needed. Issues such as climate change, digital transformation, migration, geopolitics, and development require multiple perspectives. For instance, an interregional consortium or a joint task force between Asian and European think tanks develops common and mutually beneficial advocacy and policy agendas, while also sharing expertise and best practices across different regions. However, capacity building must be considered within the framework of mutual learning, best practices, or, at a fundamental level, dialogue. At STEAR, we do advocate for equal partnership between our Asian and European counterparts.
Think tanks should play their role as thought leaders and a pillar of civil society themselves. They are not the government’s public relations specialists or international donors’ project executors; think tanks should also listen to and engage with the broad voices of “the people,” including civil society organisations; they should be bridge builders. Therefore, think tanks do not just diversify their funding source, but also who gets to shape the agenda and policy. It is during this time period that think tanks’ voices should be even louder and more critical, and this can be achieved by enhancing solidarity among think tanks in different regions.
